

## **RESPONSE TO**

## **FXI's SUBMISSION**

## ON

## SABC'S SECTION 22 LICENCE AMENDMENT APPLICATION

19 JULY 2004

#### 1 Introduction

- 1.1 On 30 April 2004 the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) published in Government Gazette no. 26318 the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) application for an amendment to its broadcasting licences (licence amendment application) as required in terms of section 22 of the Broadcasting Act no. of 1999, as amended (the Broadcasting Act).
- 1.2 On 19 May 2004 ICASA published a subsequent Government Gazette no. 26380 inviting interested parties to make submissions on the SABC'S licence amendment application including the financial information that was not included for scrutiny by interested parties during the period prescribed in the above Government Gazette.
- 1.3 Interested parties had until 9 June 2004 to submit their representations to ICASA and the SABC.
- 1.4 We set out hereunder our comments in respect of the representation received from the Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI). We shall first set general comments on the policy framework and legal context of the SABC's application. Thereafter we will address specific comments made by FXI.

### 2 Policy framework for public broadcasting

The policy framework for public broadcasting in South Africa has been under development for over a decade. This policy framework seeks to establish the role and values of the public broadcaster within the South African broadcasting environment.

Many of the submissions address this framework. The key argument in these submissions is in essence the following: broadcasting policy places extraordinary obligations on the SABC because it is a public broadcaster and in order to ensure these obligations are met, the Authority should impose specific licence conditions on the SABC, in excess of what is contained in the licences of commercial operators.

Leaving aside for the moment the parameters of section 22 of the Broadcasting Act, which requires that any licence conditions imposed during this process must be those which are necessary to reflect reorganisation, let us consider the link which is drawn between the SABC's mandate and proposed licence conditions, for it is here that false assumptions are made by various representors. These are:

- that without specific licence conditions, the SABC will have fewer obligations than commercial operators and that it is in the interests of fair competition to set such licence conditions for the SABC
- that licence conditions are required to ensure the SABC delivers on its public mandate.

We will address these in turn.

#### 2.1 SABC vs commercial sector obligations

The first of these assumptions is that without specific licence conditions, the SABC will somehow have fewer obligations than commercial operators. This is patently untrue as with or without specific licence conditions, the SABC's obligations as a public broadcaster far exceed the requirements of the commercial sector.

The SABC agrees with the representations when they cite the Triple Inquiry Report and the White Paper on Broadcasting Policy to demonstrate what is expected of the SABC as a public broadcaster. We are in agreement that our mandate is wide and complex and that more is expected of the SABC than of commercial operators.

The SABC is bound by its Charter to fulfil a wide range of obligations including the following:

- to make services available in all official languages and to be of high quality in all languages
- to reflect the diverse cultural and multilingual nature of South Africa
- to provide significant news and public affairs programming
- to support traditional and contemporary artistic expression
- to provide significant educational programming on topics such as human rights, health, early childhood development, agriculture, culture, religion, justice and commerce.
- to advance the national and public interest
- to include national sports programming as well as minority and developmental sports
- to cater for the spiritual needs of South Africans
- to provide for the needs of the disabled
- to provide programming for children

- to provide programming for youth
- to provide programming for women
- to extend its services throughout the country

No commercial operator is required to fulfil such a broad mandate.

It is, however, precisely because of this mandate that the SABC is granted a unique status, including a somewhat different regulatory regime from other broadcasters, as is captured in the Broadcasting Act.

In this context, the arguments that specific licence conditions are required to ensure fair competition or "balance" the obligations made by the commercial sector, are misleading, and ignore the statutory obligations that the SABC is, in law, enjoined to discharge. The SABC's ability to compete "unfairly" with the commercial sector is curtailed by its extensive programming obligations and its obligation to provide programming for all audience segments.

It is also worth noting that the model of licensing which commercial operators are seeking to impose on the SABC, is a model which they themselves have in the past argued is not always appropriate.

Etv, for instance, has on a number of occasions appeared before the Authority arguing that certain of its licence conditions unduly constrain its ability to compete effectively. The commercial sector now wishes to see these sort of conditions imposed on the public broadcaster, in addition to its extensive legislative obligations, thereby seeking to limit the potential of the public broadcaster to compete.

#### 2.2 Ensuring delivery

A second assumption in the representations which must be addressed is that without licence conditions such as those which are imposed on commercial operators, the SABC will not deliver on its public mandate. Again this is false and seeks to ignore the SABC's delivery to date as well as the multitude of checks and balances which are built into the legislative framework which governs the SABC. This legislative framework is distinct from that which commercial broadcasters operate within. For commercial broadcasters, the licence issued by ICASA is virtually the only mechanism through which the Authority can ensure compliance. For the SABC, the Broadcasting Act contemplates a number of mechanisms:

- A Charter is set and the Authority is empowered to monitor and enforce compliance with the Charter
- A Board, consisting of representatives acting in the public interest, is appointed
- The SABC is required to develop editorial policies and a Code of Practice
- The SABC is required to allow the public to comment regularly on its services.
- In addition the SABC must also comply with the PFMA, and the Shareholder compact.

In this context, the regulatory regime which is appropriate for commercial broadcasters cannot simply be transplanted to the public broadcaster. To do so would be to ignore the unique status granted the public broadcaster. This unique mirrored status is internationally. As detailed in the SABC's application key lessons from international best practice include the following:

 The public broadcaster is viewed as unique, having different roles and responsibilities from commercial broadcasters. The public broadcaster's mandate is wide and complex. It cannot be quantified easily and it cannot be met wholly on individual services. The nature of its mandate means that fulfilment of the mandate is not necessarily measurable over a limited period. The public broadcaster is thus treated differently by governments and regulators, who do not necessarily impose the approach taken with commercial broadcasters on the public broadcaster.

- The boards of governors of these public broadcasters are entrusted with ensuring the broadcaster's compliance and responsiveness to the public. This reduces the need for detailed licence conditions to govern the broadcaster, which is encouraged to be accountable through its internal policies, set and overseen by its board. In contrast to commercial broadcasters, whose only mechanism of public accountability is through the regulator, public broadcasters have multiple levels of accountability and various instruments available to ensure this accountability. These may include annual reports, dialogue with parliament and the regulator, and public consultation. Public broadcasters are bound to account to the public for their performance, so they often set targets or make promises annually.
- Generally, public broadcasters are given flexibility of obligations/licence conditions and are not faced with extensive and onerous conditions on programme quantity and specificity. Where there is specificity, this is negotiated and agreed by the regulator/government and the public broadcaster.
- There is an approach of building consensus between the board, stakeholders, parliament and regulator on the roles and responsibilities of the public broadcaster, and

achievement of the public mandate.

 Public consultation by the public broadcaster is given high priority by governments and regulators, and this assists in ensuring that the broadcaster is responsive to the needs and interests of the public.

In South Africa, this unique status is also reflected in the fact that the SABC is granted a statutory right to programming independence, not given to other broadcasters.

The SABC's unique status is already reflected in its existing licence conditions which were renewed in March 2004. Despite the protests by commercial operators and other groups, contained in the representations on the section 22 application, none of these parties articulated their concerns about the SABC's licences during the renewal process. Nor did the Authority make any finding that the SABC had not delivered on its mandate to date or that the existing licence conditions are insufficient to allow for such delivery.

The SABC in its application also sets out in some detail its public service delivery to date. Representations have not put forward any persuasive evidence to contest this delivery, but yet the argument is made that specific licence conditions are required to guarantee future delivery.

### 2.3 Conclusion

The Broadcasting Act, as amended, is the legislative conclusion of many years of discussion and consultation on the appropriate policy framework for public broadcasting. This legislative framework was preceded by a number of policy papers and is consistent with the principles established in those papers. In the final analysis, however, it is the legislative framework and not the policy papers which inform it, with which the SABC must comply.

In its section 22 amendment application, the SABC has set out a model for this compliance, having regard to its extensive public mandate and its unique status as a public broadcaster. The representations have failed to demonstrate in what respect this model is out of keeping with the policy framework for public broadcasting. The SABC maintains that it is fully consistent with this framework.

#### 3 Legal context

#### 3.1 Introduction

- 3.1.2 Arising from the policy framework, the licence amendment application has a very particular statutory context. It is that the amendment application has been necessitated by the new section 22 of the Broadcasting Act, 4 of 1999, introduced in terms of the Broadcasting Amendment Act, 64 of 2002.
- 3.1.3 That section requires that the SABC makes application for "such amendments" to its existing licences as are necessary "in order to reflect their re-organisation of the corporation in to the public service division and the commercial service division and its related obligations in terms of this Act and the IBA Act."
- 3.1.4 There can be little doubt that ICASA has jurisdiction, in the present proceedings, to consider only an amendment by the SABC which is brought in terms of section 22(1) of the Act; and that, in turn, is limited to an application to amend the existing licences, only to the extent that is necessary in order, by means of such amendments, to

reflect their re-organisation of the SABC, and its *"related"* obligations.

- 3.1.5 Before the amendments effected by the Broadcasting Amendment Act no. 64 of 2002, section 9(1) of the Broadcasting Act, 4 of 1999, provided that the SABC had to consist of two separate operational *"entities"*, being a public service, and a commercial service.
- 3.1.6 After its amendment, section 9 provides that the SABC must consist of two separate operational "divisions", namely a public service "division", and a commercial service "division".
- 3.1.7 Before the amendment, section 9(2) provided: "The public and commercial services of the Corporation must be separately administered." After the amendment, section 9 (2) provides: "The public and commercial service divisions must be separately administered and a separate set of financial records and accounts are to be kept in respect of each such division."
- 3.1.8 Plainly the application for the licence amendment application is required to deal with the change within the SABC of its public service, to a public service division; its commercial service to a commercial service division; and the requirement that now, as distinct from before, a separate set of financial records and accounts are to be kept in respect of each of these two divisions.

#### 3.2 The scope of section 22

3.2.1 The scope of the application is expressly limited by the terms of section 22(1) of the Broadcasting Act. It is not a general application for a new licence. Nor is it a general application for the amendment of licensing conditions. This application is restricted in its terms to being one for "necessary" amendments to the existing licences in order to reflect the statutorily required reorganisation of the SABC into two divisions. The changes that may be sought in an application under this provision are those that are required by the situation. In other words without them the separation between the two divisions will not be reflected in the SABC's licences. What this means is that the application contemplated by section 22 is not intended to deal with related or incidental or merely potentially beneficial matters. It must be confined to those changes that a separation between the two divisions demands.

3.2.2 The notion that the application for amendment is limited in this fashion is similarly reflected in the provisions of section 22(2) of the Broadcasting Act. Whilst that makes the provisions of the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act (the IBA Act) applicable to the application that is qualified by the emphatic word of reservation "but" and goes on to provide that:

> ... irrespective of the of contents the application of the Corporation, the Authority any appropriate may impose licence conditions which are necessary in order to reflect the reorganisation of the Corporation into the public service division and the commercial service division and its related obligations in terms of this Act and the IBA Act."

- 3.2.3 In other words the powers of the Authority to impose licence conditions are limited in precisely the same language as the obligation of the SABC to apply for amendments to its existing licences.
- 3.2.4 When one relates that back to the application for amendment of the existing licences and the power of the Authority to impose appropriate licence conditions one sees that the application for amendment of the licences and any conditions imposed will revolve around ensuring that the SABC licences adequately reflect the statutory requirement in section 9 of its operations being divided into two divisions that are to be administered separately.
- 3.2.5 The licences must simply reflect what the statute in any event requires. Of course if there are provisions in the existing licences that are incompatible with such a division then it would be necessary to amend the licences to remove them or alter them in a manner that would render them compatible with the requirements of the statute, which in our view is not the case.

In either event the need for amendment cannot be taken to provide the occasion for a complete review and revision of the SABC's licences by the Authority.

3.2.6 Section 22(2), however, is concerned with the situation where the Authority seeks to impose additional conditions over and above the amendments sought by SABC. It may only do so where it believes that the amendments proposed by the SABC do not go far enough to reflect the requisite purpose. In our view the SABC has fully discharged with its obligation in our licence amendment application.

#### 3.3 **Re-organisation**

- 3.3.1 The meaning of the word "reorganisation" as contemplated in section 22(1) relates only to those changes that have to be brought about in the administration of the SABC in consequence of giving effect to section 9 of the Broadcasting Act. The underlying assumption is that the old corporation was operated and administered as a single entity. In terms of section 9 the SABC is now required to have two separate operational divisions, namely the public service division and the commercial service division and to administer these separately.
- 3.3.2 To achieve that result the Legislature contemplated that some levels of reorganisation of the SABC would have occurred. Section 22 refers to that reorganisation, namely, the reorganisation consequent upon the division of SABC into two separate divisions.

333 Section 9(1) contemplates that the public service division and the commercial service division will be "operational" In other words it is concerned not with the divisions. administration of the SABC's activities as a whole but solely with the operational aspects thereof. What it contemplates is that the provision of the public service, that is the service that is required to operate in terms of section 10 of the Broadcasting Act, shall for operational purposes be separated from the commercial service which operates in terms of section 11 of the Broadcasting Act. These operational divisions are to be "separately administered" and a separate set of financial records and accounts is to be kept in respect of each such division. That does not, however, mean that the broadcasting activities of the SABC must be separated into two hermetically sealed divisions.

3.3.4 Taking the matter of separate sets of financial records by way of example, there is no reason to create two separate accounts departments. It suffices for the accounts to be kept in such a way that separate financial records and accounts may be produced in respect of each operational division. Presumably the purpose of this is to identify on the one hand what the costs are of providing the public service and on the other whether the commercial services are being run profitably. The purpose cannot be to prevent cross-subsidisation of the public service by the commercial service because section 11(1)(d) specifically provides that such cross-subsidisation is to take place.

What is required is that the accounts that the Board is required to keep in respect of each division (sections 10 (4)(a) and 11(3)(a)) must be in such a form that they are capable of being audited separately from those of the other division and the SABC as a whole.

3.3.5 There are other areas of the SABC's activities which will likewise necessarily have to remain on a consolidated basis. The legal department provides an example of this. So does the Human Resources Department. The fact that the operational activities of the SABC are divided in the manner required by the Broadcasting Act does not mean that the persons employed in the different divisions are to be treated as being employed by different They will be employed by the SABC and employers. their terms and conditions of employment will in many cases no doubt be determined by way of collective bargaining between the SABC and their representative trade unions. The Broadcasting Act does not require that these activities be divided and apportioned between the

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divisions. All of this is clear from section 26 of the Broadcasting Act.

- 3.3.6 The SABC is a company and as such its management is vested in its Board constituted in terms of section 12 of the Broadcasting Act. Its day to day operations are to be dealt with by the three executive officers referred to in section 12(b). Therefore each operating division must report to the Board via the appropriate executive, who would presumably be the Chief Operations Officer and ultimately the Group Chief Executive Officer.
- 3.3.7 As with any organisation there must be appropriate levels of interaction between different divisions and appropriate levels of executive authority to resolve disputes, ensure decisions are taken and oversee their implementation. The executive responsibilities for co-operation and coordination between the services are vested in a functionary below the level of the Chief Operations Officer and the Group Chief Executive Officer but ultimately reporting to them, either directly or indirectly through a person in a superior position.

#### 3.4 The term "related obligations"

3.4.1 Sections 22(1) and (2) go on to refer to "its related obligations in terms of this Act and the IBA Act". When one construes the language of section 22 this is something distinct from the reorganisation of the SABC into two separate divisions. The section says that the amendments to the SABC's existing licences must be those which are necessary in order to reflect two things. The first is the reorganisation as discussed above. The second is the "related obligations" of the SABC in terms of the Broadcasting Act and the IBA Act. They are not defined in section 1 of the Broadcasting Act. The

"related" obligations are those obligations imposed under the Broadcasting Act and the IBA Act that relate to the reorganisation of the SABC into a public service division and a commercial service division.

3.4.2 The IBA Act pre-dates the amendment to the Broadcasting Act brought about by the Broadcasting Amendment Act 64 of 2002. It is difficult to see therefore how any obligations under the IBA Act can be related to the SABC's reorganisation, bearing in mind that the obligations under the latter Act did not contemplate such a reorganisation. The IBA Act makes no reference to the division of the SABC's activities into a public service division and a commercial service division. It simply provides in section 1 under the definition of "public broadcasting service" that this means any broadcasting service provided by the old Corporation and "shall include a commercially operated broadcasting service" provided by the old Corporation. There is some difficulty therefore in seeing what obligations may be imposed by the IBA Act that are related to the reorganisation of the SABC into two divisions.

- 3.4.3 Under the IBA Act the SABC provides a public broadcasting service, including its commercial operations, and is the holder of public broadcasting licences. There are no obligations owed by the SABC under the IBA Act that relate to its reorganisation into two divisions under the Broadcasting Act. It seems that the reference to this in terms of section 22 is drafting superfluous.
- 3.4.4 In other words the draftsmen inserted this provision *ex abundante cautela* simply to cover the situation that if there were provisions of the IBA Act that bore upon the separation of SABC's operations into two divisions then

there should be consequential amendments to SABC's public broadcasting licences under the IBA Act in order to reflect that situation.

3.4.5 This is a well-established canon of construction that a statute should not be construed, if that can be prevented, in such a way that its provisions are superfluous, void or significant. However, the rule is not absolute and one is not entitled in the search for meaning to read into the statute some power or provision that is not there.

<u>Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Shell Southern Africa</u> <u>Pension Fund</u> 1984 (1) SA 672 (AD) at 678C-F.

As has been pointed out there are examples where words or a provision are inserted in a statute simply in order to avoid doubt.

<u>Maphosa v Wilke en andere</u> 1990 (3) SA 789 (T) at 799B-D.

3.4.6 It seems that these words were simply inserted to ensure that if there is a provision of the IBA Act that bears upon the situation of separating the SABC's activities into two divisions then consequential amendments to the SABC's licences will have to be made to accommodate that.

However, there does not appear to be any provision in the IBA Act that has such an effect.

#### 3.5 The process

3.5.1 Reverting to the procedure that must be followed in regard to the amendment of the SABC's licence contemplated in terms of section 22 it is expressly provided in section 22(1) that the SABC must apply to the Authority for such an amendment. Of course, there is

nothing in the IBA Act that deals with an amendment of a licence in these circumstances. For example the provisions of section 52(1) of the IBA Act contemplate amendments to licences in circumstances far removed from those under section 22 of the Broadcasting Act. It is for that reason that section 22(2) provides that the relevant provisions of the IBA Act apply to the application "with the necessary changes". The purpose of that is to make the procedures contemplated under section 52 applicable to the application for amendment without the Authority being constrained by the provisions of section 52(1) in its consideration of the application. That consideration must take place squarely within the framework and subject to the constraints provided by section 22 of the Broadcasting Act.

3.5.2 The SABC's licence amendment application of its broadcasting licences, is made in terms of s.52(1)(c) of the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act, 153 of 1993.

3.5.3 That sub-section provides as follows:

- "52 <u>Amendment of Broadcasting Licences</u>
- (1) A broadcasting licence may be amended by the Authority only –
  - (a) ...
  - (b) ...
  - (c) if requested thereto by the broadcasting licensee, and then only if and insofar as the proposed amendment –
    - (i) does not militate against orderly frequency management;

- (ii) will not prejudice any other broadcasting licensee; and
- (iii) will not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or with any agreement or convention contemplated in paragraph (b); ..."

#### 3.6 Specific licence conditions

- 3.6.1The main features of the structure established for the<br/>SABC in terms of the Broadcasting Act is as follows:
- 3.6.1.1 First, a Charter for the SABC is laid down in the Broadcasting Act. This is not provided for in respect of any of the other broadcasters. The Charter exacts from the SABC an extensive range of detailed obligations. These range from the range of programming that is to be provided (s.6(4))(a) - (d), to a host of objectives (s.8) which include the obligation to provide services other than broadcasting services, to provide and disseminate information in a wide variety of media, to establish and maintain libraries and archives, to organise concerts and shows; to collect news and information from all over the world, to carry out research and development work, and amongst other things to develop and extend the SABC's services beyond the borders of South Africa.
- 3.6.1.2No such obligations are imposed on any of the<br/>other broadcasters.
- 3.6.1.3 Second, ICASA is obliged not only to monitor the SABC in relation to its compliance with the statutory Charter; it is also obliged to enforce compliance (section 6(2)).

3.6.1.4	No such extensive degree of statutory invasion exists in respect of any of the other broadcasters.	
3.6.1.5	Third, the SABC is obliged to prepare and submit written policies dealing with seven different matters to ICASA that will show how the SABC intends complying with ICASA's code of conduct (s.6(5) (a)).	
3.6.1.6	No such statutory obligation exists in respect of the other broadcasters.	
3.6.1.7	Fourth, the statutory mechanism established in terms of the Act for the control by ICASA of a wide range of the SABC's objectives by means of scrutiny and review of the written policies to be prepared and submitted to ICASA, is unique.	
3.6.1.8	No such statutory mechanism exists in regard to the other broadcasters.	
3.6.1.9	Fifth, the SABC is obliged to provide suitable means for regular inputs of public opinion on its services, and in addition to ensure that such public opinion is given due consideration (s.6(7)).	
3.6.1.10	No such inroad exists in respect of any of the other broadcasters.	
3.6.1.11	Sixth, in addition to providing written policies to ICASA, the SABC is obliged also to provide a code of practice which, being part of its Charter, is subject to monitoring and enforcement by ICASA (section 6(8)).	
3.6.1.12	Seventh, although the SABC is obliged in terms of section 11(1)(d) of the Broadcasting Act to subsidise its public services by means of its commercial services, this may not occur otherwise	

than on an arms length commercial basis (section 8A(13) - (15) of the Broadcasting Act).

- 3.6.1.13 No such financial constraint exists in regard to the commercial broadcasting services to be provided by the other broadcasters.
- 3.6.2 This extensive range of detailed obligations is imposed on the SABC as one juristic entity, and not on either one or the other of the two operational divisions specifically.
- 3.6.3 Whether the SABC discharges these obligations through its commercial service division or its public service division, or both, does not concern the legislature: it exacts simply that the SABC discharges those obligations.
- 3.6.4 It follows therefore that there can be little doubt that the position of the SABC is statutorily unique. A specific structure is established for it, which does not exist in respect of the other broadcasters, and whereby a wide variety of statutory obligations in the public interest is imposed on it. The Broadcasting Act establishes also a mechanism whereby the SABC's compliance with the obligations is monitored and enforced by ICASA.
- 3.6.5 On the other hand it is plain that the SABC is obliged, in pursuing its statutory obligations and objectives, to act on the basis of programming independence as provided for in section 6(3) of the Broadcasting Act.
- 3.6.6 The notion advanced by FXI that the SABC licence conditions ought to be imposed to the extent of specificity that applies in respect of the other broadcasters, is accordingly not only inconsistent with the structure established for the SABC in terms of the Broadcasting Act; it also renders it impossible for the SABC to discharge its statutory obligations.

- 3.6.7 The suggestion is made at the foot of page 15 that the SABC suggests that it is entitled itself to determine the content of its own licence conditions. This is a mischievous suggestion. The SABC does nothing of the kind. It submits that, having regard to the structure of the Broadcasting Act, the SABC is in a unique position, one which is different from that of other broadcasters; and in the light of that position, especially the fact that ICASA is obliged to monitor and enforce SABC's compliance with its Charter, its policies, and its Code of Practice, it would be inappropriate if the licence conditions sought in addition to prescribe detailed restrictions on the SABC's statutory programming independence referred to in s.6(3) of the Broadcasting Act.
  - 3.6.8 We point out that there is already a substantial curtailment of that independence by means of the local content regulations, and those apply in any event.
  - 3.6.9 The slip shows particularly, in the context of the submissions by FXI, when it comes to deal with the SABC's statutory enshrined independence (para. 3.5 at p.17 of the submissions). The submission here is that the statutorily enshrined independence should be limited to enabling the SABC to decline a telephonic instruction by a high ranking politician five minutes before a broadcast not to screen certain material.
- 3.6.10 The suggestion is that this independence ought not to be read as applying beyond that, and in particular ought not to be understood as suggesting that the SABC has programming independence, should be rejected. The statute is express and in this respect, the SABC is unique when compared with other broadcasters.

3.6.11 The SABC maintains its view as articulated in its amendment application:

"In short, the rights of the SABC to enjoy freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming independence as referred to in section 6(3), and more importantly as enshrined in section 16(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the Constitution, will be infringed and denied if it were suggested that the Authority had any entitlement to approve programming content. The Authority in this context is a regulator; it receives and reviews the written instruments by means of which the SABC itself complies with its own obligations, and enjoys its own freedoms. The written instruments are, as set out above, the policies, the licence conditions, and the code of practice. But it is the SABC itself that determines the content of these instruments."<sup>1</sup>

3.6.12

These editorial policies are intended to enable ICASA to monitor and enforce compliance by the SABC of its Charter. With the statutory obligations imposed on the SABC by the Broadcasting Act sight must not be lost that the SABC in the pursuit of its objectives and the exercise of its powers in terms of the Act enjoys freedom of expression and journalistic, creative and programming independence. An attempt on the part of ICASA to prescribe programming conditions would not only compromise the SABC's journalistic, creative and programming independence, but would also constrain the SABC in carrying out its statutory obligations.

3.6.13 With regards to the argument that the SABC is seeking to undermine the Authority's power to regulate broadcasting as provided for in the constitution the SABC's response is detailed below.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Page 43 Application for amendment for SABC licences in terms of section 22 of the Broadcasting Act.

- 3.6.14 ICASA is juristic person established in terms of Section 3 of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act No. 13 of 2000 ("ICASA Act").
- 3.6.13 In terms of Section 3 (3) ICASA Act is a wholly independent body subject only to the Constitution and the law, and must be impartial and must perform its functions without fear, favour or prejudice.
- 3.6.14 In terms of Section 3(4) ICASA Act must function without any political or commercial interference. A careful consideration of the provisions of Section 3 of the ICASA Act demonstrates that the independence contemplated therein in relation to the discharge by ICASA of its obligations, or the performance of its functions relates to political and commercial interference. It is also clear from a reading of that section that whatever it does in the performance of its functions is subject only to the constitution and the law. Consequently, ICASA, in the performance of its functions cannot act outside the provisions of either the Broadcasting Act, the IBA Act or the Constitution.
- 3.6.15 It is our considered view that notwithstanding its independence, in dealing with the SABC, ICASA is enjoined to recognise the unique statutory position in which the SABC is placed, and therefore do what it is required to do in terms of Section 6 (2) of the Broadcasting Act. In relation to the Section 22 Amendment Application, ICASA's powers may only be exercised in terms of what is contemplated in Section 22.

#### 4. <u>Responses to other issues</u>

#### 4.1 Funding

FXI on page 20 under the heading "The funding base for the SABC and the problems related to it" suggests that the "SABC is showing less interest in the possibility of expanded, and not just narrow (for Regional stations and World Cup 2010) funding so that it can achieve its public mandate".

This accusation is unwarranted. The SABC annually solicits funding from government by providing plans and budgets regarding the fulfilment of its public service mandate.

# 4.2 Independent Production and in-sourcing/in-house production

FXI on page 21 argues that the amount of productions outsourced to the independent sector be capped at 50% for the PBS Channels. The proposal to have in-house production is retrogressive and would work against the many initiatives which have been put in place to promote growth in the independent production industry. Since 1995 when the Triple Inquiry Report was issued, the submissions from local production houses has been to maintain and possibly increase independent production quotas. The Triple Inquiry Report summarised the goals for the independent production quota as follows:

"A number of submissions lauded an independent production quota as an important mechanism for achieving diversity in programme production, for encouraging a wide range of views and experiences to be reflected on air, and for creating opportunity for a great number people to enter television production industry"

## 4.3 Designation of PBS and PCS Channels

FXI on page 22 queries why SABC services have been allocated to the PBS and PCS divisions respectively. The re-organisation of the SABC as provided

for in section 9 of the Broadcasting Act as well as the allocation of services and channels to the respective divisions has been determined by the Board and management, after extensive studies.

The ambit of this amendment application does not require an analysis of these allocations.

### 4.4 Addendum 1

What follows speaks largely to FXI's Addendum 1: Summary of research on SABC public service radio. The SABC's comments on the research are as follows:


- The research methodology used is questionable relying as it does largely on stakeholder meetings of committed activist organisations.
- The research is not only dated, but has not been verified by quantitative means as will be demonstrated below.
- Reliability and validity cannot be examined where no indication has been given of the sampling for the focus groups.
- Nevertheless, the following will show that the findings from the FXI research are incorrect, untested and/or dated.


## 4.4.1 "Commercial imperatives have forced a bias toward the educated class"

- The bulk of average weekday audiences on SABC's indigenous African language stations are educated up to some high school and including matric completed - 67 percent.
- This concentration equals the adult population distribution in South Africa where 68% have some high school/matric education.
- SABC's public radio stations super-serve the less educated masses those with no education and up to some primary schooling completed.


They make up a quarter of the country's adult population, but make up close to 30% of all average weekday listening on SABC's ALS stations.

- As the graph on availability by gender indicates, women are as available as men for radio during the morning listening peak at 7am.
- At 18h30 however, only 48% of women are available for radio and this is not because of programming at that time. Most ALS stations broadcast current affairs at this time - as they do during the morning peak.
- It is speculated that this is because women bear the burden of work in the home, more than men at this time.





## SABC Black Language Stations Weekly Reach into Older Women Demographic Indexed to National Population of Women 50+



# 4.4.2 "Commercial imperatives have lead to the marginalisation of mainly older women"

- The latest radio survey results (RAMS April 2004) indicates that the SABC's indigenous African language stations have an above average reach into the poorer sections of older women listeners.
- While the LSM 1-4 profile for all women aged over 50 is just 49%, the SABC's PBS portfolio has 69% of its older women in this LSM segment
  - an above average incidence.
- Community radio on the other hand, attracts the bulk (47%) of its older women from the wealthier LSM 7-10 segment.

### 4.4.3 "Commercial imperatives have forced an urban bias on stations"

- The SABC's PBS Radio portfolio reaches 68.9% of all rural communities (of less than 40 000 inhabitants) on an average day (Amps 2003B)
- The concerns about Umhlobo Wenene FM becoming increasingly focussed on areas outside of the Eastern Cape are misplaced.

E Cape	W Cape	Gauteng	
76%	10%	6%	Current (Apr 2004)
(75)	(9)	(6)	Radio only (Jan-Dec 2003)
(75)	(9)	(6)	Radio & TV (Jan-Dec
			2002)

 As the trended profile table above shows, the bulk of the station's average weekday audience continues to come from the Eastern Cape, with only 6% coming from Gauteng.  This is true of most of the stations in the PBS portfolio - with the exception of Lesedi FM, which has the highest Gauteng profile at 36% of its weekday audience (RAMS April 2004).

## 4.4.4 "Insufficient Promotion of SA Talent, especially in relation to music"

- The SABC's PBS Radio stations provide extensive support for South African music. Some examples of recent initiatives are detailed below:
- The SABC's PBS Radio portfolio is currently in the final stages of the popular Voice of Choice campaign - a vehicle to discover and develop local singing talent using the accessibility and reach of public radio.
- Over 100 000 calls were received on the competition lines during the audition period alone, which closed on Friday 21 May.
- The broadcaster and the listeners of all 11 participating radio stations look forward to the 14<sup>th</sup> of August when the final celebration of the country's diversity and fusion of cultures will be showcased in public.
- The broadcaster also conducted auditorium music research into its audiences' likes and dislikes of the music on station playlists in March 2003.
- Contrary to 'perpetuating ethnic stereotypes', the SABC's PBS portfolio acknowledges that the music preferences of its audiences will be diverse and contain cross-over appeal as demonstrated in just three of many examples:
  - Phalaphala FM's audience preferences included a South Sotho song (*Batho ba lefatshe by Bohale ke ntoa*) which ranked at number 19 in the station's Top Twenty.
  - Umhlobo Wenene's listeners ranked Jabu Khanyile's *Ungavumi* at no.16 in their Top 20 list of songs preferred.
  - Motsweding FM listeners were partial to Thembinkosi's isiZulu gospel tune, Usathane - placing it at no. 11 in their list of Top Twenty songs.

### 4.4.5 "Uneven Investment in Programming"


 Over the past 20 months, the SABC has committed resources to a strategic re-investment in the PBS Radio portfolio. This has entailed equitably investing on all stations in everything from human resources to technology, and most importantly - in the full spectrum programming that is the portfolio's key point of difference.

# 4.4.6 "Commercial imperatives have lessened the accessibility of stations to listeners"

- The SABC's Market Intelligence Division took the initiative last year to establish the SABC People Panel - a panel of respondents from 12 000 households nationally who have agreed to give of their time in the coming 14 years to assist the broadcaster in its understanding of listener and viewer needs.
- These respondents as the graph below indicates make up a research base that is the same in profile as the industry's main currency survey - RAMS.
- PBS radio has successfully piloted the concept of Core Listener Groups with 4 stations in the portfolio (SAfm, Munghana Lonene FM, Umhlobo Wenene FM and Lotus FM) and will extend this to all stations
  making CLGs an operational part of each station's programming.
- These groups facilitate the coming together of station personnel and listeners in a meeting that combines workshop features with the semi-guided discussion format of focus groups.
- In this way, both consensus and probing are enhanced while the station maintains contact with its listeners in the key performance area of programming.

## SABC People Panel and Saarf RAMS





### 5. <u>Conclusion</u>

The SABC is of the view that it has comprehensively discharged with the requirements of section 22 of the Broadcasting Act, in its amendment application. The proposals on issues to be addressed in licence conditions contained on page 23 of the FXI submission are not relevant in the context of this amendment application.