

(Re)writing Xenophobia: Understanding Press Coverage of Cross-Border Migration in Southern Africa

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Xenophobia – although difficult at times to disentangle from other psychological and structural influences such as racism, nationalism and ethnocentrism – refers specifically to “a deep dislike of foreigners” (Oxford Concise Dictionary). This definition describes a discrete set of attitudes that manifest themselves in the behaviours of governments, the general public and the media. This is certainly true in South and southern Africa where xenophobia is distinctive and widespread (albeit uneven across the region) and where the print media in particular has been accused of exacerbating the phenomenon.

In a previous article, Danso and McDonald (2001) reviewed English-language press coverage in South Africa from 1994 to 1998 and argued that reportage and editorial comment on cross-border migration was largely anti-immigrant and unanalytical. Not all such treatment of the issue by the media was negative and superficial, and there did appear to be gradual improvement over time, but the overwhelming majority of newspaper articles, editorials and letters to the editor employed sensationalist, anti-immigrant language and uncritically reproduced problematic statistics and assumptions about cross-border migration in the region.

The purpose of the current paper is threefold. First, it updates the previous study to determine what, if any, changes have occurred in South Africa with respect to xenophobia in the press by looking at English-language newspapers from 2000 to early 2005 and comparing the results to the former survey. Second, and more importantly, the paper poses a series of hypotheses as to why press coverage in South Africa is xenophobic (or not) and where we might expect to see trends developing in the future.

The paper also expands the analysis to other countries of the region – namely, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia (with the emphasis on the first two due to the relatively small sample sizes of news material available for the latter). An analysis of these additional countries helps to expand our understanding of the regional aspects of xenophobia in the press and places our study of South Africa in empirical and theoretical perspective. The variations across the region serve to highlight important theoretical differences, which show that there is no

single or universal explanation for xenophobic press coverage in southern Africa (or its non-xenophobic counterpart). It is a highly contextualised phenomenon.

Southern Africa is not the only region to experience this problem, of course. Xenophobia in the media has been documented in many parts of the world, in many different languages and media (although print media has attracted the most attention, largely for the same methodological reasons that have shaped this research, as discussed below). The situation in Europe has been studied most closely (with Eastern Europe, Russia and the South Caucasus coming under particularly intense scrutiny of late) but Canada and the United States have figured prominently as well (Chavez 2001; King and Wood 2001; Henry and Tator 2002; Haynes and Devereux 2004; see also the websites of organisations such as The Refugee Media Group in Wales, The Media Diversity Institute, European Youth for Action, The Moscow Helsinki Group, The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Refugees, The Asylum-Seekers and the Media Project, The International Media Working Group Against Racism and Xenophobia, and the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance).

Surprisingly, few of these studies attempt to explain the causes of xenophobia in the press. For the most part they are descriptive in nature, providing a summary of the extent and character of xenophobia, typically followed by a plea for improvements in the way that migration is covered. The same shortcomings apply to the previous work on this subject in South Africa which, as noted above, is one of the primary reasons for this follow-up research (see Minnaar and Hough 1996; Reitzes and Dolan 1996; Peberdy and Crush 1998; McDonald *et al* 2000; Danso and McDonald 2001; Harris 2001).

A second problem with existing research is that it tends to conflate racism and xenophobia. This blurring of concepts is understandable in the European and North American context where (im)migrants are predominantly visible minorities, but in southern Africa xenophobia is directed towards all foreigners, black and white, and emanates from all racial groups. Black Africans from other parts of the continent are most widely and adversely affected by xenophobia (and the darker the skin the worse the prejudice), but immigrants from Europe, North America and Asia are also victims. We therefore attempt to illustrate the nuances of these attitudes and how they manifest themselves in the press for each of the countries discussed.

That said, we must acknowledge the methodological and analytical insights that we have gleaned from the existing literature. Methodologically, we have borrowed on the now well-established tradition of discourse analysis to determine whether a text is xenophobic or not and how xenophobic it is. Secondly, we draw on the long-standing recognition in the academic literature on the press that the media is both a reflection of racism and xenophobia as well as an instigator. In other words, the media reflects reality (xenophobia exists, therefore it is not surprising that people in the media would represent these popular sentiments) but it

can also distort what is actually going on (Henry and Tator 2002:5; Fairclough 1995). Our position on this matter is that both arguments are valid and help to explain why certain elements of the press in southern Africa remain highly xenophobic while others are becoming less so.

We draw also on the political economy argument that the media is controlled largely by a corporate elite that shapes and reproduces ideologies in order to reinforce dominant class interests through the discursive medium of the press (Golding and Murdoch 1991; Herman and Chomsky 1994; McChesney 1999). We are not, however, deterministic in this position. We acknowledge the relative autonomy of journalists and editors to provide 'objective' news and opinion, and recognise that newspapers can and do print material that is in direct conflict with the interests of their owners or with capital more generally. Certainly this is true in the case of xenophobia in southern Africa where, as we shall see, newspapers print xenophobic rhetoric that threatens the interests of capital in terms of access to skilled and unskilled labour from outside the country. These caveats aside, corporate interests and ideologies are arguably the driving force behind a newly emerging pro-immigration trend in the print media (at least in South Africa).

Methodology

The study draws on a comprehensive electronic database of English-language newspaper clippings related to cross-border migration in southern Africa. The time frame for the coverage is mid-2000 to early 2005. The countries included in the database are South Africa, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In this paper we cover South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe in detail while providing only brief qualitative studies of Namibia and Zambia due to the relative shortage of data. In the case of non English-language countries Mozambique and Angola, media samples are not readily accessible and are therefore excluded. The paper also excludes Lesotho, Swaziland and Tanzania due to insufficient data.

Our examination of print media was facilitated by the existence of a large print media database on cross-border migration at the Southern African Migration Project.¹ The collection stretches back to 1975 and comprises the most thorough compilation of English-language print media from the region on this topic. This is the same data base used by Danso and McDonald (2001) to assess xenophobia in the South African press in the 1990s and therefore provides sourcing consistency.

We have confined ourselves to the text of these newspaper clippings, ignoring photographs and other potentially important opinion-shaping representations. While it is possible to evaluate photographic and illustrated images for xenophobic content – as Chavez (2001) has ably demonstrated in his assessment of magazine covers in the American context – we have left this element out of our assessment for ease of analysis and because xenophobic content in the press in

southern Africa is so obviously anti-immigration that no additional proof of the problem is required.

One weak spot in this textual approach is that millions of southern Africans are functionally illiterate and do not read newspapers.² Nonetheless, millions of others in the region do read papers (combined readership of dailies and weeklies in South Africa alone is close to 20 million people)³ and many others hear about newspaper coverage from family and community members. The print media remains also an influential source of news for policymakers (arguably the most influential medium in the region) and it impacts on other forms of media such as television and radio (Harber 2002; Jacobs 2004).

In this respect, it should also be noted that English-language newspapers dominate circulation and are undoubtedly the most influential print medium in the region. English is not the only print medium – there are important Afrikaans, French, Portuguese and African-language newspapers that help to shape public opinion in the region – but English is the lingua franca of southern African political discourse. Also, many non-English newspapers in the region are owned by English-language conglomerates and they source from the same English-language wire services. With the advent of on-line newspapers the sphere of influence of the English-language press is only likely to grow in the future.

For South Africa there were a total of 1773 articles in the database for the period under review. A random selection of every sixth article resulted in a sample of 294 articles (approximately 16 per cent of the total data set). The selected articles include news items, editorials and letters to the editor,⁴ and were selected only if they originated from that country. In Zimbabwe, for the same time period, there were a total of 457 articles, half of which were reviewed to ensure a sufficient sample size (228 articles). Similarly for Botswana, half of the 384 articles were included in the analysis (for a total of 192). For Namibia and Zambia the databases were insufficient for the kind of statistical analyses applied to the other countries; hence their cursory treatment here.

The leading newspapers and news agencies in the region were the most common sources for the articles reviewed but some more obscure print media did appear as well (these have been collapsed into ‘other’). Because of the oligarchic nature of the media in southern Africa (six large media companies dominate the South African press, for example) articles sourced from the same group of companies were placed together. For example, items under the Independent newspaper group in the South African sample come from different newspapers in that ownership group, such as *Cape Times*, *The Star*, *Saturday Star*, *Cape Argus/Weekend Argus*, *Sunday Independent*, *Pretoria News*, *Daily News*, *Business Report* and *Sunday Independent*. Beyond mere practical considerations, the recoding is also in line with reality and reflects how media groups such as the Independent operate as a business unit. Far from having independent identities, the Independent group’s newspapers are organised regionally, with regional managers wielding as much, if not more, power than the individual newspaper editors. The Independent

is also characterised by extreme synergy in content and editorial policy. Columns, opinion articles and news items are repeated in the various regional papers and are presented virtually unchanged. Significantly, *Business Report*, the central business news operation of Independent, is included as a daily, undifferentiated supplement in all its regional papers.

To assess the xenophobic content of the data-set we employed two interrelated discursive techniques. Following Danso and McDonald (2001:119), the first was to assess the articles for their depth of analysis and for their attitude towards immigration. Our intent here was to determine what percentage of the articles in the sample were pro- or anti-immigration and what percentage of the articles were analytical in their coverage of migration issues. To accomplish this, a pair of coordinates was assigned to each article to reflect the qualitative characteristics it possessed. These coordinates were then recorded on two orthogonal scales which measured the different qualities of the papers surveyed, with the size of the circles representing the relative number of articles that fell into that set of coordinates (see **Figures 1–4**).

The vertical scale in these figures measures how anti- or pro-immigration the articles are; -5 and +5 respectively denote 'very anti-immigration' and 'very pro-immigration' while zero (0) represents the neutral point. The horizontal scale measures the depth of analysis of the articles; that is, whether they are analytical or unanalytical in their reportage (-5 represents a very unanalytical article and a +5 represents a very analytical article). Superimposing the scales on each other produces a four-quadrant grid.

An unanalytical article would be one that uncritically reports facts and figures about immigration that are known to be controversial or problematic (for example, the long-discredited figure of some nine million illegal immigrants living in South Africa which continues to be reproduced in the press (see Crush 1999 for a discussion of this debate.) Articles which simply tell the reader that "X number of illegal immigrants were arrested at the weekend" or that "illegal immigrants cost the South African taxpayer X billion rand per year", without any critical interpretation of these 'facts' or any attempt to contextualise these allegations within the broader debates on migration would also be considered unanalytical, to varying degrees.

Our definitions of 'anti' and 'pro' immigration (the vertical axis) were as follows. Pro-immigration articles advocate a free(r) movement of peoples across borders in South and southern Africa and are generally sympathetic to the plight of migrants and refugees in the region. Anti-immigration articles, on the other hand, call for a decrease or complete shut-down of the number of migrants/refugees that should be allowed into the country and are largely antagonistic towards the presence of migrants/refugees in the country. The second method of analysis employed was an assessment of the language and metaphors used in the articles and the kinds of associations made between immigration and other social and economic developments (such as crime). This closer textual analysis of the articles

concur with previous research claims that the print media tend to be hostile to immigrants (Reitzes and Dolan 1996) but takes the analysis one step further by providing a quantitative account of the percentage of articles which use a particular phrase or make particular accusations/associations about the role of migrants in the country. It also provides a chronological comparison for South Africa.

This discursive analysis has its limitations, of course. The selection of criteria and the subjectivity inherent in the ranking of articles is clearly open to dispute. But unlike other forms of prejudice – such as racism – xenophobia tends to be relatively easy to define and quantify in the southern African press. As Henry and Tator (2002) point out in the case of racism in the media, “the rhetoric of racism is illusory, racism finds it easy to hide itself.” Xenophobia in newspapers in the region is anything but, revealing itself in crude and often shocking ways.

We supplement this textual analysis with in-depth interviews with editors from four major newspapers in South Africa: the *Mail & Guardian*, *Beeld*, *Sunday Times* and *Business Day*. These editors answered questions related to coverage of migration issues in their newspapers, whether they thought the media influence public opinion and public policy on migration, and what their own personal opinions and understandings of cross-border migration are (budget restrictions did not allow for interviews with editors in other countries in the region).

These newspapers were chosen because of their importance within media and policy circles in South Africa. The *Mail & Guardian*, despite its small circulation (approximately 250 000 readers of its weekly publication), is arguably the most important paper for South African political elites. It is also an interesting case in ownership terms. Its majority British shareholders sold its shares to a Zimbabwean publisher in July 2002 and the paper sells well in Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia. *Business Day* fulfils a similar function for South African business elites and has recently increased its coverage of continental business developments. The *Sunday Times* is the largest circulation newspaper in the country with some 3.5 million readers of its weekly edition. Finally, to compensate somewhat for the otherwise Anglocentric focus of the research, we interviewed the editor of the large, Afrikaans-language newspaper *Beeld*. Interestingly, similar trends emerge in his comments on xenophobia to those of the English-language editors.

Xenophobia in Southern Africa

Extensive quantitative and qualitative research since 1995 has shown that public opinion in southern Africa, with some important variations between countries, is deeply xenophobic (Reitzes 1996; Crush 1998, 1999; Frayne and Pendleton 1998; Morris 1998, 1999; Crush and Williams 1999; Human Rights Watch 1999; Mattes *et al* 1999; Peberdy 1999; McDonald 2000; McDonald *et al* 2000; Harris 2001; SAMP 2001; McDonald and Crush 2002; Crush and McDonald 2002; Crush and Pendleton 2004). The harshest anti-immigrant sentiments are ex-

pressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana, the anti-foreign 'troika'. Citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe "are considerably more relaxed about the presence of non-citizens in their countries" but negative attitudes persist in these countries as well, with calls for stiffer immigration laws and harsher border surveillance measures being commonplace (Crush and Pendleton 2004:1). It is only in Lesotho that one finds a *laissez-faire* attitude to immigration, perhaps due to that country's dependence on open borders with South Africa to sustain its economy (Gay and Green 1997; Gay 2000, 2002). These anti-immigrant attitudes cut across all major socio-economic and demographic categories. Young and old, black and white, highly educated or not, southern Africans display an extraordinary consistency in their antagonism towards foreigners, particularly those from other countries in Africa and especially those deemed to be illegal migrants. Even refugees are viewed negatively on the whole (with many being sceptical of *bone fide* refugee status).

Another important feature of xenophobia in the region is that in fact most residents have relatively little direct contact with people from other countries (Crush and Pendleton 2004:25). Anti-immigrant sentiment in the region is not a result of regular, direct personal contact with foreigners but rather a product of (mis)information from secondary sources such as school, friends and the media.

Research Results in South Africa

The results of the research in South Africa reaffirm previous findings of the print media in that country, which show that a large proportion of newspaper coverage is anti-immigration and non-analytical. The coverage is, however, still highly polarised, with a sizeable portion of the articles being pro-immigration in their orientation and/or analytical in their discussion of migration issues. There is an even sharper polarisation of media coverage now than there was in the 1990s, with the data from 2000–2005 (**Figure 2**) falling almost entirely into the bottom-left or top-right quadrants of the grid diagram, as compared to the data from the 1990s which fell predominantly in the bottom-left quadrant (**Figure 1**). This pattern suggests a shift towards more pro-immigration and analytical articles.

Figure 1: South African Press Coverage (1994–1998)




Figure 2: South African Press Coverage (2000–2005)




Table 1: Percentage of Articles with Negative References to Migrants and Immigration

Type of Negative Reference	Percentage of Sample with the Negative Reference			
	South Africa (1994–1998)	South Africa (2000–2005)	Zimbabwe (2000–2005)	Botswana (2000–2005)
Makes reference to migrants as job-stealers and/or as a general burden to the country's economy	24	6	5	19
Associates migrants with crime	25	19	9	26
'Nationalises' and/or 'Africanises' crime	11	8	15	23
Refers to non-citizens as 'illegals'	38	22	7	29
Refers to non-citizens as 'aliens' ¹	24	4	0	1
Uses negative metaphors to describe migration into the country (e.g. floods, hordes, waves)	9	21	8	22
Presents negative images of other African countries	12	15	15	28
Uses inflated statistics on the number of (im)migrants in the country ²	17	2	n/a	n/a
Uses sensational headline(s)	26	9	21	26
Percentage of articles that include at least one negative reference	56	44	22	39
N =	132	294	228	192

1. The term 'alien' is commonly used in South Africa (The Aliens Control Act was the name of the immigration legislation until recently) but is not part of the popular lexicon of neighbouring countries.
2. This item applies to South Africans only and refers specifically to the debate cited earlier about inflated statistics on the number of 'illegal immigrants', which received widespread coverage in the 1990s.

The research also reveals a continuation of negative stereotypes of (im)migrants in the South African press. The character and significance of these negative references has been discussed at length elsewhere (Danso and McDonald 2001) and will not be repeated here, except to say that images of migrants as job stealers, criminals and illegals only serve to perpetuate ill-considered stereotypes of migrants and migration and continue to be used in reportage on these issues in the South African press. **Table 1** outlines the frequency of negative references using nine indices, and provides data from both South African surveys (1994–1998 and 2000–2005) as well as from Zimbabwe and Botswana (with the latter two being discussed in greater detail below). What is notable in the South African case is a decline since the last survey in the percentage of articles using negative references, with a drop in almost every category, some of which are quite significant (for example, references to migrants as job stealers and as an economic burden to the country). The frequency of negative references also decreases over time in the 2000–2005 South African sample (as was the case with the previous study), suggesting an ongoing gradual improvement.

This issue-specific improvement is countered, however, by the fact that close to half (44 per cent) of the articles still used at least one form of negative reference (down slightly from 56 per cent in the previous study). This cumulative effect of xenophobic rhetoric is perhaps the most revealing statistic of all and underscores the extent to which xenophobia still permeates the English-language press.

But it should also be noted that the source of these xenophobic comments are skewed in terms of their source, with the vast majority emanating from the wire services. For example, of the articles that used the term ‘job stealers’ the South African Press Agency (Sapa) was by far the worst offender, making up more than a third of the articles that refer to migrants in this way.

Explaining South African Coverage

To explain this polarised newspaper coverage we have elected to break our analysis into two categories: the first section poses reasons for continued xenophobia, while the subsequent section puts forward hypotheses to explain what appears to have been a partial decrease in xenophobic coverage in the country.

Reasons for Ongoing Xenophobia

The most obvious, and perhaps most likely, reason for the persistence of xenophobia in the South African press is the widespread existence of xenophobia itself. In other words, media coverage simply reflects the reality on the ground in the country, either through journalists reproducing their own images and ideas of migrants and migration and/or by editors providing space for articles, letters and opinion pieces that they feel reflect public consensus on the issue.

Mondli Makanya, editor of the *Mail & Guardian* at the time of this research (subsequently editor of the *Sunday Times*), argued in his interview that, “media generally reflect social reality and relations within society. I would not blame the media for fanning xenophobia in any way.” Makanya also suggested that it was “difficult to cover stories about Nigerian migrants”, of which there has been particularly negative reportage, and that editors and journalists “should not be politically correct about it ... [T]he fact is that a disproportionate number of people from that country, as opposed to migrants from elsewhere, say Congo or Senegal, are involved in crimes.” According to Makanya, “it is unfortunate that the behaviour of some nationals from that country specifically influences how they are covered, but it is also reality”. (He was unable to substantiate his claims when pressed for statistics and evidence.) There was no consensus amongst the editors, however, on whether the press merely reflects public opinion or whether it might also create and perpetuate negative stereotypes. Peet Kruger, editor of *Beeld*, conceded that, “it would not make sense to deny such an impact”, but qualified that, “I would not go so far as to say that it is done deliberately.”

Whether the xenophobic press is merely a reflection of public sentiment or stems from xenophobia within the press itself is ultimately impossible to prove. What is clear is that there is a cycle of negative (mis)representation of cross-border migration in the English-language print media in the country and it is likely that public opinion and journalistic opinion simply feed off of one another.

A second, and necessarily related, explanation for continued negative press coverage can be found in the openly xenophobic attitudes of some South African political representatives and government officials. Although the general tenor of official government policy on migration is changing and becoming more liberal (more on this below) it is not uncommon to find reports of openly xenophobic statements by government officials that pass unchallenged in the press.⁵

Most of this negativity in official circles is directed towards migrants from other African countries, while migrants from Europe and North America are treated much more positively, suggesting a certain degree of racism confounding an otherwise across-the-board anti-foreigner perspective. One editor accused the business press in particular of a subtle form of racism when they call for a more liberal migration regime. He suggested their zeal was aimed at white immigrants:

There is a subliminal thing running through South African newspapers, that when you are talking about attracting foreign skills you are talking about Europeans and white migrants. That is the subtext. So when you talk about a white mining chief facing deportation, then there is a campaign about anti-xenophobia. However, every day Africans are deported from this country and a lot of those affected have skills, but their deportations are not reported with the same sort of zeal.

A third explanation for the persistence of xenophobic reporting can be traced to the heavy reliance on wire services which stream in extremely simplistic and

xenophobic material. Economic pressures explain the ubiquity of wire articles in South African papers. Most newspapers have experienced extensive cutbacks in staff and journalists, as owners insist on improved profits in the context of increased competition (since 1994, at least four new city-wide newspapers have been launched in South Africa and one new national daily, which subsequently closed down), depressed advertising markets, rising costs of paper and distribution, and other cost factors. The result is a uniformity of tone and lack of variety of news reportage across different media outlets (Harber 2002). Peet Kruger further traces the superficial reporting on migration to the media's reliance on police reports, which are free for newspapers (and which typically identify crime suspects by nationality).

The reliance on wire services and police reports also confirms comments made by the editors we interviewed who agreed that reporters do not specialise in migration issues and that their newspapers do not have a specialist reporter for this beat. *Business Day* and *Beeld*, for example, incorporate coverage of migration under political news if it involves legislation, or under crime if it involves an alleged wrongdoing, thus making it difficult to make space for analytical coverage that might challenge.

Peter Bruce, editor of *Business Day*, argued that, "there is a wider story about immigration into South Africa and around southern Africa which is interesting politically [and deserves our attention], but it does not necessarily directly affect the people who read the paper." The implication: Why bother to invest major resources on an in-house reporter when information can be sourced at relatively little cost from wire services and government agencies?

A fourth reason for the persistence of xenophobic reporting is the growth of a tabloid press in South Africa. As elsewhere, tabloids latch on to reactionary and sensational issues and attitudes that help to sell newspapers. The impact of these newspapers – published also in Afrikaans and Zulu – is presently under-researched in South Africa, with no systematic analysis of their impact on politics in the country. The most important of these papers are the *Sowetan*, *Sunday World* and *Daily Sun* (and its Sunday version, *Sunday Sun*) which are published in English, and the Zulu-language *Isolezwe* published from Durban by Independent Newspapers. A newcomer is NasPers–Media24's *Kaapse Son* which was launched in 2003 and aimed at a predominantly working-class coloured readership in the Western Cape. All of these newspapers, while setting as their mission the creation of a serious black reader class, have thus far done nothing of the sort, instead peddling sex, sports and crime in the style of the UK tabloids, including very reactionary editorial positions and reporting on migration.⁶

Deon du Plessis, the publisher of *Daily Sun*, is on record as saying the paper has a "strictly non-political outlook" (see *Business Day*, January 31, 2003). The paper does not employ a political editor or have opinion editorials. This does not mean that these papers do not have a political position, however. These are commercial

media which tend to play up to populist, exclusionary sentiments in society to boost circulation or to engage in circulation wars.

Unfortunately, we are not in a position to prove these allegations empirically because our sample included only a handful of articles from these newspapers. Although all the articles were xenophobic and simplistic in their coverage of migration, there is insufficient statistical data to make conclusive comments. However, our review of the material available, our general reading of this tabloid press, and our understanding of the international tabloid press suggest a strong link between the continued presence of negative, unanalytical coverage of migration in South Africa and the growth of this medium since the late 1990s.

Reasons for a Decrease in Xenophobia

Possible explanations for a decrease in xenophobia in the South African press (or, more accurately, an increase in the polarisation of coverage on migration) are equally complex. We suggest five possible reasons. The first relates to the fact that immigration is no longer a new – and therefore unknown – quantity in South Africa (with fear of the unknown being the actual etymological root of the term xenophobia). The initial influx of migrants after the end of apartheid – particularly those from other parts of Africa – no doubt came as a shock to many South Africans steeped in an isolationist tradition, and may have contributed to some of the original sensationalism on the topic in the press. But after a decade of cross-border activity it could be argued that some newspapers and journalists have a better grasp of the issue and have perhaps overcome their own xenophobia. As Peter Bruce, editor of *Business Day*, put it in his interview: “People are less frightened about immigration [today]. It is not a new phenomenon any more. Sooner or later, if we have a decent economy it absorbs these people and they become ordinary. They have kids, they go to school. They are like you and me.”

There also appears to be a growing professionalism on migration issues, at least in some newspapers. Some editors have even stated their interest in creating an educated and dedicated staff on the matter, suggesting some recognition of the dismal status quo discussed above. The editor of *Beeld*, for example, stated that he would like to increase coverage of migration issues: “We want to cover it more substantially, with better-trained people, who have time, and to cover it in-depth.” Makanya of the *Mail & Guardian* agreed, saying that the paper “needs a dedicated person” to cover migration and that the paper should “be at the forefront of educating people, in a very creative way, about the changes to society.”

As Peter Bruce suggested, “things will only change when a paper, say *The Star*, hires one of these Nigerians to its staff and he would write about his community in a completely different way.” However, a number of South African newspapers have in fact hired journalists from neighbouring countries, but no demonstrable shift in coverage is evident.

It is also useful to note that the *Mail & Guardian* is owned by a Zimbabwean national and the *Sunday Times* has established bureaus in Lagos and Nairobi staffed by nationals from those countries. *This Day*, a short-lived national daily, owned and operated by a Nigerian press conglomerate, appeared to be the least xenophobic and most pro-immigration of the major English-language newspapers in the country (with no negative stereotyping of Nigerians at least). However, it closed down in late 2004.

A third possible explanation for improved coverage can be traced to changes in the South African government's position on migration. As official government policy moves towards a more liberal, 'managerial' approach to migration, press coverage necessarily becomes more liberal in its attempts to reflect the main currents of migration debates. This is bolstered by the now dominant liberal discourse of human rights across virtually all public policy matters in South Africa and elite circles in general.⁷

The newspaper editors interviewed all share this liberal vision of immigration. According to Tsedu:

Migration is quite critical to our future as a country. If you look at a major city like Johannesburg, parts of the city have higher percentages of non-South Africans living there than locals, and they are becoming more entangled in the social issues of the city, of the nation. It will be important for us as a paper to stay on top of those developments and to make sure we help those people and the South African public to understand the dynamics of these changes.

Mondli Makanya agrees that South Africa "will get more immigration. People will come to South Africa. We are a working economy in a poor region and secondly, borders are breaking down. The main thing is how we manage it." Peet Kruger, editor of *Beeld*, acknowledged that his newspaper does not have explicit guidelines to cover immigration, "but our general editorial policy is respect for human rights, including the rights of immigrants. From that perspective we will not promote stereotypes of a group of people just because of who they are."

The impact of public debates on the need to improve media coverage on migration should not be underestimated either. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) initiated a series of workshops for journalists in the late 1990s under the title "Roll Back Xenophobia" (RBX). Mathatha Tsedu, then chair of the South African National Editors' Forum (SANEF), swears by its impact, and correspondence with one of the main organisers of the campaign shows it to have been a sophisticated and comprehensive education and training programme.⁸

Some editors, however, questioned the effectiveness of such educational initiatives. Mondli Makanya, for example, who has participated in RBX, was sceptical of the methodology and wider impact of the campaign:

I don't think it has any impact. It's arrogant, pompous, and it comes from a pious perspective as to why xenophobia exists. I think most black South Africans understand why black, working class South Africans, feel the way they do. It's about economics. It's also about people in transition, about a class of people arriving below them, undercutting them and competing with them in a context where they must scramble, of high unemployment, where the state is absent.

Peter Bruce of *Business Day* and Peet Kruger of *Beeld* expressed similar views, making it difficult to say what the actual impact of RBX has been. Nevertheless, the mere existence of such a campaign, and the heightened awareness and sensitivity to the problems of xenophobia that have accompanied it, represent significant progress and may have contributed in some ways to the improvement in press coverage in the country.

Another possible explanation for improved media coverage is a growing pan-African discourse in South Africa (most notably with President Thabo Mbeki's African Renaissance campaign) that has created new political, cultural and economic imperatives to be more positive about African integration. SANEF actively supports the African Renaissance and South African newspapers have been broadly supportive of its objectives in their reportage and editorials.

Why have newspaper editors supported this pan-African ideal? One explanation is a genuine commitment to the principles of pan-Africanism. Another, not necessarily contradictory, explanation is the selfish economic imperatives of newspaper-owners and editors. Media groups in South Africa are becoming more multinational in scope and are keen to expand into the region and elsewhere in the continent. It follows that if they are to be successful outside South Africa they cannot run negative articles about their new readers.

Most of the large, mainstream newspapers in South Africa have substantially increased their share of African news. The *Sunday Times* has established bureaus in Lagos and Nairobi and also brings out an Africa edition which is distributed in neighbouring southern African states. The *Mail & Guardian* is keen to develop a southern African regional identity as well, according to Makanya, and *News24*, the news division of NasPers, has established bureaus in Abidjan and Nairobi.

The business press predictably focuses on business developments outside South Africa. *Business Day* routinely allocates two or more pages to African news (and has brought out a magazine, *Business Africa*). South African business and investor presence has increased notably on the continent since the end of apartheid, resulting in a thirst for news and analyses of legislative and economic developments in these countries.

A final, and in our minds most important, hypothesis for explaining an increase in pro-immigration media coverage relates to the interests of South African capital, and its desire to ensure access to skilled and unskilled labour from outside the country through a relatively open and liberal immigration regime. With the rise in

xenophobia in South Africa in the 1990s there was a very real possibility of government introducing a much more restrictive immigration system. Anti-immigrant comments from the then Minister of Home Affairs and other senior government officials raised widespread concern in the business community about labour access. The mining industry was the first to raise the alarm, but the siren call for a more open immigration system was soon taken up by a variety of other sectors in the economy and by neoliberal think-tanks such as the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) (CDE 2000, 2001, 2002).

Big business has arguably been the single most influential factor in shaping a more liberalised migration regime in South Africa. Individually and collectively, capital has made continuous and vigorous policy interventions on migration by way of formal submissions on policy development, the sponsoring of seminars and conferences, and through its support for organisations such as the CDE.⁹ Capital is not entirely satisfied with the current legislative framework, especially when it comes to skilled personnel,¹⁰ but the threat of highly restrictive borders has been largely averted.

That business leaders would also apply pressure to newspaper owners and editors to influence their coverage of immigration policy in this way is not difficult to imagine, although many editors may simply have adopted the same ideological position of their own accord. Certainly there were many more articles, opinions and editorials calling for a more business-friendly immigration policy in the period covered by this research (2000–2005) than there were in the previous study.¹¹

Peter Bruce of *Business Day* typifies this ideological link, insisting that a liberal immigration regime that addresses the needs of business is at the core of his paper's editorial policy:

If asked to articulate [our editorial policy], I would say that we need as liberal an immigration regime for South Africa as possible to allow companies to buy the skills they need from whoever and wherever they want them. We are very uncomfortable with the kinds of restrictions that the [current immigration laws] impose. Our constituency as a newspaper is skills absorbing businesses and as an editorial entity we are concerned with ensuring that in as much as we address immigration policy, we address the problems of our constituency.

As a result, the bulk of stories on migration in *Business Day* and in business-oriented supplements in newspapers such as the *Sunday Times* focus on the legislative process surrounding the adoption of a new immigration law, and on attracting skilled migrants.¹²

Media in Zimbabwe and Botswana

Before discussing our research results in other SADC states it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the print media in the region, much of which is considerably less free than its counterpart in South Africa. Most observers are negative about the state of the press in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. A ranking by Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières) (RSF) of media around the world in 2002 gave relatively low press freedom scores to southern African countries (Hall 2002). South Africa was the best in 26th place, followed by Namibia (31), Tanzania (62), Mozambique (70), Swaziland (89), Angola (83) and Republic of Congo (113).

There have been some positive knock-on effects from increased press freedoms in post-apartheid South Africa, but newspapers in the rest of the region remain largely state-controlled or heavily dependent on the state, and are under constant pressure from government and ruling party representatives. In such a climate, self-censorship of journalists is not uncommon. Governments have also been known to withdraw advertisements from newspapers as punishment for criticism of their policies (Phiri 1999; Hall 2002).

Zimbabwe, at 122nd on the RSF list, is considered the most repressive of the SADC states surveyed. In their 2004 annual report, RSF identified Zimbabwe as one of the countries in which “journalists pay with their blood or their freedom for the despotism that continues”, and in their 2005 annual report simply stated that “Freedom of the press simply does not exist in Zimbabwe” (RSF 2004, 2005). Botswana is considered to be “one of the African countries that allow most press freedom, even if the authorities still monitor the state news media closely.” However, the RSF did note that: “Economic constraints could reduce press diversity [in Botswana] in the short term” (RSF 2005).

The Zimbabwean state enjoys an exclusive monopoly over broadcasting in that country (both television and radio) and has a substantial stake in the print media sector as well, including the Zimbabwe Inter-Africa News Agency (ZIANA) and the daily newspaper *The Herald*. In addition, the editors of the privately-owned *Sunday Mirror* have been generally supportive of ZANU–PF and of President Robert Mugabe.

Newspapers that openly oppose the Mugabe regime have come under considerable pressure from the state, with the largest daily – the *Daily News* – having been forced to shut down in 2003. It reopened briefly in 2004, only to be challenged once again by the state and effectively shut down by drawn-out and expensive court battles, despite the courts having found no wrongdoing. The paper now runs only an on-line edition.

The extent of the problem in Zimbabwe can be seen in the following statistics from the RSF annual report from 2004. In that year alone, seven journalists were convicted by a court, 16 were arrested, four were physically attacked, four were threatened, four were unfairly dismissed, three were expelled from the country,

the premises of one newspaper was searched, and two media outlets were censored (RSF 2004). Nevertheless, Zimbabwe maintains a vibrant print media culture in spite of the pressure, with independent newspapers offsetting some of the effects of state propaganda.


In Botswana also, the state controls important elements of the print media. Government owns the only countrywide news agency, Botswana Press Agency (BOPA), which provides much of the copy for the state and independent print media (Zaffiro 2000), and it owns the largest daily newspaper, the *Botswana Daily News*. There is also legislation aimed at curbing press freedom. In 2000, the Media Institute of Southern Africa published a 62-page report of media-unfriendly laws and practices in the country. Much of the abuse involves informal harassment of the media or bullying of writers and editors by government officials (Nyamnjoh 2002:757). The government has also been known to punish newspapers whose reporting or editorial comment displeases them by suspending advertising. Nevertheless, Botswana has an independent press which has managed to “earn credibility for its critical and investigative journalism over the years” (*ibid*).

Another concern with media in the region is that skill levels tend to be quite low, characterised by “numerous misleading front page headlines, inaccurate reports usually retracted by an apology the next day, superficially researched articles and untruthful reports” (Kasoma 1986:45). In Botswana, for example, “the majority of Botswana journalists, government and private, are secondary school graduates, young and inexperienced, with no formal media training. Left alone with little mentoring or guidance, the young reporter has to find his or her own way. Even BOPA messengers and drivers have been pressed into service as reporters” (Zaffiro 2000:96).

Research Results in Zimbabwe

On the whole, print media coverage of migration-related issues in Zimbabwe is just as polarised as it is in South Africa, although for different reasons. As **Figure 3** illustrates, most articles reviewed fall into the bottom-left or upper-right quadrants of the grid, revealing a strong pro- and anti-immigration split (although overall there are more pro-immigration and analytical articles in the Zimbabwean than in the South African sample).

Figure 3: Zimbabwe Press Coverage (2000–2005)



Much of this pro–anti divide occurs between newspapers that are state-owned (*The Herald*, *Sunday Mail*) or state-supporting (*Zimbabwe Mirror*) on the one hand, and the independent press on the other. The former tend to take a negative and simplistic view of migration-related matters, often referring to opponents and critics of the government as “illegal immigrants”, even when it involves their own journalistic colleagues.¹³ Foreign journalists in particular are ridiculed in the state media, and have been harassed, imprisoned, banned, and summarily deported. In January 2001, for example, two foreign correspondents who had worked and lived in Zimbabwe for extended periods, Mercedes Sayagues, a freelancer, and Joseph Winter, a BBC correspondent, were branded “meddling foreigners”. Sayagues, who wrote for the *South African Mail & Guardian*, was accused of being a UNITA (the former rebel Angolan movement) supporter, while Winter was accused of being a South African spy. The coverage of these issues in the opposition press is the reverse in all respects.¹⁴

The same divide applies to the print media’s attitudes towards immigration policy. Most opposition media favour relatively open migration policies and question the motives of the Zimbabwe Citizenship Act, which further tightened laws against dual citizenship, while state media support government’s ongoing efforts to revoke dual citizen rights.¹⁵ Critics argue that the Citizenship Act was aimed mainly at the white minority in the country (many of whom also have British passports) and that the state is using the Act to remove individuals suspected of supporting the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).¹⁶

Zimbabwe’s declining economic position and political instability also mean that migration reports in its media are much more focused on emigration, mainly by members of the white minority involved in commercial farms who are the main targets of the government’s land reform programme, but they also discuss the exodus of (primarily black) political and economic refugees. The state-owned and supporting media question the motives and patriotism of those leaving, while the independent press appears more accepting and supportive of the rationale behind the large-scale departure.¹⁷

These results confirm the conclusions of a series of studies by the independent Media Monitoring Project-Zimbabwe (MMP-Z) group which has accused the state-owned media of “using the same strategy as the government-controlled radio in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, which actively stoked inter-ethnic violence” (Johwa 2004; MMP-Z 2002). Through its monopoly of broadcasting, state media have aired a constant deluge of news bulletins and commentaries in which Mugabe is praised, and the British government, the opposition MDC and ‘foreigners’ are blamed for the political and economic crises in Zimbabwe. The same applies to its print media outlets.

How do we explain this divide between state-owned and state-supportive media on the one hand and the independent press on the other? The most probable explanation is that immigration has become a flash point for larger political and economic debates in the country, and the print media have simply taken up sides

accordingly. In this respect, migration debates in the press become ammunition in a much larger political battle and may have little to do with public attitudes towards migrants or levels of xenophobia in the press corps itself.

Having said that, there is less inflammatory and sensational language about immigration in the Zimbabwean press than there is in the South African press, particularly as it applies to migrants from other African countries. Only 5 per cent of articles in Zimbabwe refer to migrants as job stealers, only 9 per cent refer to migrants as criminals and only 7 per cent refer to migrants as illegals. The cumulative total shows that only 22 per cent of articles make at least one negative reference to migrants (see **Table 1**). Although higher than it should be, this last figure is considerably lower than South Africa's 44 per cent of articles with negative references.


It may be that independent Zimbabwean journalists are less xenophobic than their South African counterparts, possibly indicating lower levels of xenophobia in the Zimbabwean population as a whole. It may also be that Zimbabwean journalists – at least those with the independent press – are more attuned to migration debates than their South African counterparts, having dealt with the issue since the early 1980s, soon after Zimbabwe's independence.

Another possibility may be that the independent press in Zimbabwe is ideologically disposed towards a more liberal immigration regime in the country, for the same reasons outlined above for the (neo)liberal press in South Africa. In other words, the independent press in Zimbabwe is broadly supportive of basic human rights and pan-African integration, as well as big business' concerns about access to labour. Moreover, to the extent that the opposition MDC has also become increasingly neoliberal in its general political and economic orientation, it would follow that the opposition press would be more attuned to neoliberal pro-immigration positions.

Research Results in Botswana

Despite the relative freedoms of the press in Botswana, newspapers in that country have produced, on average, the most xenophobic coverage of the three countries surveyed. As **Figure 4** illustrates, the bulk of the 192 articles analysed were anti-immigrant and unanalytical (that is, most of the sample falls into the bottom-left quadrant of the grid). News items, editorials and letters to the editor were largely superficial, repeated the worst stereotypes of refugees and migrants, and blamed immigrants for crime or for unfair competition in a scarce job market.

Figure 4: Botswana Press Coverage (2000–2005)



Close to a fifth of the articles made reference to migrants as “job stealers” (19 per cent) and more than a quarter made reference to migrants as “criminals” (26 per cent) and as “illegals” (29 per cent). Approximately 22 per cent of the articles made negative references to other African countries, and 28 per cent used sensational language to describe migration. In total, 39 per cent of the articles in the Botswana sample had at least one negative reference to migration (see **Table 1**).

Where migrants were referred to as criminals or mentioned in connection with an illegal activity, their country of origin was mentioned 23 per cent of the time, serving to nationalise the alleged crime. While a number of reports single out Namibians and South Africans,¹⁸ Zimbabweans bear the brunt of this national targeting and are “the most likely victims of police harassment, public prejudice, stereotyping and debasement” (Nyamnjoh 2002:768).¹⁹ *Mmegi*, for example, writes of an “influx” of “illegal immigrants”, of which “over 90 per cent of them [are] Zimbabweans”.²⁰

While the government-owned press and BOPA are generally guilty of these kinds of xenophobic sentiment, the country’s independent press is also complicit in this problem. A case in point is a report in *Mmegi* on October 20, 2000, which editorialises on “the infiltration of [foreign] quacks and under-qualified practitioners in the country’s health system”. In another story in the same edition a reporter writes about a “Chinese racket” to ensure that “a lot of them were brought into this country”.²¹ There would appear to be a gradual improvement over the period of time in question, however, mirroring the trends in the other countries studied.

What are the reasons for this xenophobic coverage? Once again the explanations are complex, and once again they differ somewhat from the other countries surveyed. One reason that has been cited is the lack of training of journalists, creating situations where journalists fail to probe facts or question unsubstantiated statements, racist sentiments, or spurious claims (Zaffiro 2000:96).

The reliance on electronic and print news sources from South Africa may be a second explanation, given the high levels of xenophobic rhetoric in that country’s press. According to Nyamnjoh (2002:773) “Batswana are literally at the mercy of the media and agenda setters of South Africa.” Botswana is also dependent on other international wire services, illustrated by the high proportion of ready to print news articles in the Botswana sample (for example, Agence France Presse [AFP] and Reuters).

A further explanation for high levels of xenophobia may be the most simple of all: Botswana on the whole are highly xenophobic and the media is simply reflecting these attitudes and behaviours. Moreover, parliamentarians, members of the House of Chiefs, police, and immigration spokespeople are regularly quoted making xenophobic remarks (Nyamnjoh 2002:769), with anti-foreigner sentiments often being invoked in political campaign speeches.²² Uninterrupted rule by a single political party since independence in 1966 (democratic but prob-

lematic) (Taylor 2003), combined with weak civil society organisations, may also have resulted in an unhealthy reliance on sources emanating from the state, exacerbating the problem.

Finally, anti-foreigner rhetoric may also be linked to ongoing debates in the country about national identity. Nyamnjoh (2002:756) suggests that “the customary Tswana policy of inclusion is under pressure in an era of accelerated flows of capital and migrants.” He argues that in the first years of independence there was a general consensus around the need to promote Tswana culture and language. The state media played a major role in promoting and enforcing this trend. More recently, tensions over entitlements between the Tswana majority and minority groups such as Bakalanga are commonplace. They are often grouped with the equally derided Zimbabwean migrants. These debates have become more frequently reflected in an increased media focus on minority grievances and questions of Tswana dominance within an increasingly heterogeneous society (see Werbner 2002).

Interestingly, and in direct contrast to Zimbabwe, whites from Europe, North America and South Africa living in Botswana are generally not subjected to the same xenophobic treatment and rhetoric as blacks from other African countries or Asians (Indians and Chinese in particular) (Nyamnjoh 2002).

What, then, explains the existence of the (admittedly scarce) pro-immigration coverage in Botswana (the upper-right quadrant of **Figure 4**)? As small as it is, this pro-immigration coverage does exist and reflects the fact that not all journalists and editors in Botswana are poorly trained or xenophobic. Some no doubt pride themselves on the customary Tswana tradition of inclusion and reflect this in their writing (or editorial policy) (Campbell and Ouchó 2003).

Finally, it is possible that some journalists, editors and newspaper-owners in Botswana share the same interest as big business in ensuring a relatively open-door migration regime (the same argument that has been made above in the cases of Zimbabwe and South Africa). There is large domestic and multinational capital operating in Botswana – including many large South African firms such as Anglo-American, which is a major player in the diamond mining sector – that are just as likely to want to see guaranteed access to imported skilled labour in Botswana as they are elsewhere. That some journalists/editors should share this ideology – or that big business could persuade them to do so – is once again not hard to imagine.

Conclusion

In closing, we look very briefly at media coverage of migration in Namibia and Zambia to round out our discussion of the region. In Namibia, where xenophobia is high amongst the general public (Frayne and Pendleton 1998, 2003b; Crush and Pendleton 2004) it comes as little surprise that the media appear extremely

xenophobic. Migrants and refugees are typically portrayed as illegal, crime is associated with Angolans and Zimbabweans, and regular warnings of an ongoing influx of refugees from the former conflict in Angola are repeated in sensational ways, often by government spokespeople.²³

Disputes among refugees are often depicted as faction fighting between various 'tribal' groups who bring their conflicts to Namibia. If not depicted as promoting tribalism, refugees are presented as cunning and cheating. In one case, refugees are accused of starting fights in a refugee camp in order to have authorities repatriate them to a First World country.²⁴

There has also been a tendency in Namibia to brand opponents of the ruling party as members or sympathisers of UNITA or as aiding secessionist elements in the northern part of Namibia. The Minister of Home Affairs has even accused high court judges, when they make immigration rulings against his department, of being foreigners.

Much of this rhetoric comes from state-owned media, which is increasingly seen as a propaganda machine for a ruling party which has itself become increasingly anti-foreigner. In August 2002 President Sam Nujoma declared himself head of the Information and Broadcasting Ministry, at the same time as concerns were growing about authoritarianism in the government's approach to the media. Nonetheless, there is an independent press in Namibia which has been critical of ruling party dogma. The leading independent newspaper, *The Namibian*, rivals some of the best independent newspapers on the subcontinent, and its coverage of migration has sometimes differed from the public's and government's xenophobic stance.²⁵

In Zambia, the same general picture emerges. With few exceptions²⁶ the database shows Zambian media coverage to be replete with references to illegal immigrants, conflating all migrants with refugees, singling out certain nationalities, blaming foreigners for crime waves, and using metaphors such as "swarming masses" to describe migration into the country.²⁷ The media regularly repeat anti-foreigner rhetoric by government officials.

Overall, therefore, the press in southern Africa is largely xenophobic, suggesting a difficult, uphill battle for advocates of more tolerant and migrant-friendly print media. There are signs of a shifting, albeit polarised, approach to coverage of the issues – at least in South Africa – but xenophobic writing and editorialising in that country remains a concern as well.

Educational campaigns to address xenophobia in the press will need to take into account this complex (and shifting) terrain. There are no easy explanations for why the problem exists, and no easy solutions. What is required is a multifaceted and highly contextualised approach that takes into account nuances of xenophobia within and across countries in the region.

Finally, what are we to make of the hypothesis that improvements in migration coverage stem from the economic self-interest of big business and market-minded media conglomerates? At one level, any shift away from anti-foreigner rhetoric should be met with relief. Xenophobia in the region has led to harassment, abuse and even death for non-citizens.

But we cannot simply assume that pro-immigrant coverage in the press is going to improve the lives of migrants in the region. Larger structural concerns with the labour market and human rights in South Africa still exist and will only become more difficult to monitor and enforce as the country opens its doors to migrants in other sectors of the economy and from non-traditional source countries. Competitive economic demands continue to put downward pressure on the social wage in South Africa, and cheap, compliant labour from other parts of Africa will only become more attractive to South African capital.

There is already evidence of worsening conditions for foreign labourers in the agricultural sector (Crush *et al* 2000) and there is ample evidence of systemic exploitation of foreign workers in other parts of the world (such as Mexican farmworkers in California, Pakistani labourers in Saudi Arabia), neither of which bode well for migrant workers in the southern African region.

Nor can we assume that pro-immigration press coverage is inherently a good thing. Positive articles and editorials can themselves be politically and economically motivated, for example by the desire to ensure a liberal migration regime for capital, and are not necessarily based on good journalism, resulting in problematic 'facts' and analysis. Pro-immigration articles must also be closely scrutinised for content, origin and intent. Only then will we see a truly balanced debate about xenophobia in the region's press.

Notes

1. For more information on the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), and to access the media data base on line, see www.queensu.ca/samp. Files since 1996 only are on-line. Clippings prior to this are in hard copy only and are available for viewing at the SAMP offices.
2. In 1995 it was estimated that 10 to 15 million South African adults were functionally illiterate. Rural Africans had the highest illiteracy rates (at over 80 per cent), but a surprising 40 per cent of whites could not read at a Standard Five level (statistics are from a Harvard/University of Cape Town study undertaken in 1995 as reported in the *Mail & Guardian*, June 2, 1995). In Zambia illiteracy rates for women are as high as 30 per cent (International Monetary Fund 2000). Zimbabwe has the best literacy record in the region but illiteracy remains a problem in rural areas.
3. This figure refers to the period July 2001 to June 2002 as distinct from actual circulation figures. Data sourced from the South African Advertising Research Foundation: (<http://www.saarf.co.za/topnews.htm>). The data does not include the tabloid *Sunday Sun* or its daily counterpart *Daily Sun* or the subsequently launched daily *This Day*.
4. Letters to the editor are not direct reflections of a newspaper's attitude towards migration, but were included in the sample because they do reflect editorial decisions about what should be printed in the paper – particularly when the letters are extremely negative and xenophobic (as many of them are). Nevertheless, a relatively small portion of the sample were letters to the editor and would not skew the general findings either way.

5. See for example, *The Star*, April 30, 2002; SAPA, April 30, 2002; *Mail & Guardian*, April 25, 2002.
6. *Sunday World*, April 30, 2002.
7. See Sapa, April 16, 22 and 23, 2002. *The Star*, April 23, 2002.
8. Interview with Jenny Parsley, August 25, 2004.
9. For a full record of immigration policymaking in South Africa and interventions by various organisations see the SAMP website at <http://www.queensu.ca/samp>.
10. *Business Day*, December 23, 2002; *Financial Mail*, July 9, 2004; February 18, 2005.
11. *Business Day*, May 21 and 23, 2002; February 24, 2005; *Business Report*, May 30, 2002.
12. *Sunday Times*, May 12 and 26, 2002; *Business Day*, May 20 and 31, 2002; *Business Report*, May 28, 2002.
13. *The Herald*, February 20, 2001; September 10, 2002.
14. *Daily News*, February 24, 2002; February 24, 2005; *Zimbabwe Independent*, May 3, 2002.
15. Sapa–AFP, February 28, 2002.
16. *The Herald*, February 20, 2002.
17. *Daily News*, February 28, May 23, 2002; *Financial Gazette*, July 15, 2002; *The Independent*, August 9, 2002
18. *Botswana Gazette*, May 8 and 22, 2002; June 19, 2002; BOPA, May 27, 2002.
19. BOPA, May 8, 2002; August 5 and 19, December 31, 2002; *Mmegi*, August 16–22, 2002; *Botswana Gazette*, July 31, 2002
20. *Mmegi*, November 13, 2000.
21. *Mmegi*, October 20, 2000.
22. BOPA, May 28, 2002; June 3, 2002; July 8, 2002; *Mmegi*, February 5, 2004.
23. *The Namibian*, September 14, 2000; October 5 and 10, 2000; June 19, 2002; December 17, 2004; January 28, 2005.
24. *The Namibian*, October 4, 2000.
25. *The Namibian*, June 28, 2002; January 31, 2005.
26. Zamnet, June 21, 2002; Sapa–APA, June 13, 2002; *Zambia Daily Mail*, November 23, 2004.
27. Sapa–APA, April 22, 2002; *The Post*, April 10, June 4, 2002; *Zambia Daily Mail*, July 5, September 19, 2000.

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